April 8, 2008

Migration from Cuba to the United States –– long a concern for both countries – has reached its highest level in 30 years. Due to several new developments in migration methods, including increased legal entry, highly organized and well-funded smuggling operations, and routes through Mexico, more Cubans have entered the United States since October 1999 (over 191,000) than entered during the 1980 Mariel boatlift (approximately 125,000) and the 1994 “Balsero” raft crisis (approximately 38,000) combined.

Following several waves of Cubans resettling in the United States, the two governments reached accords to control migration in 1994 and 1995. Immigration talks broke down in 2004, however, and have not been renewed since. Nonetheless, the migration policies established in the previous decade continue to be in effect. Cubans who are stopped at sea, under current legislation, are repatriated to Cuba, while those who make it to dry land are allowed to stay and given a pathway to citizenship, earning the agreement the nickname “the wet foot, dry foot policy.” Cuban authorities claim that this policy encourages illegal immigration rather than deterring it, as the U.S. government claimed it would.

The main motivation driving Cubans to emigrate to the United States is often economic. Though recently enjoying a GDP growth rate somewhere between 6 percent (according to CIA estimates) and 10 percent (as reported by the Cuban government), the average Cuban has little access to hard currency or consumer goods. Most salaries are highly regulated by the government, and there are few opportunities for entrepreneurship or economic advancement. A degree of private enterprise is being legalized, most notably agricultural cooperatives and small-scale tourist services, and the tourism industry provides a select group with access to hard currency. Many Cubans, however, see little chance of a significant improvement in living standards. Many have family members in the United States, who share stories of economic opportunity and send remittances that account for a sizeable share of Cuban income. This often stirs the desire to leave Cuba for the material comforts available in the United States. Restrictions on political and civil rights also cause people to leave. The Cuban government often explains migration as economically motivated, and cites the U.S. embargo as a main cause of the hardship that incites citizens to leave.

In 1994, upwards of 38,000 Cubans set out for the United States in makeshift rafts in a wave of migration called the Balsero raft crisis. In response to this situation, the Clinton administration negotiated the 1994 and 1995 migration accords with Cuban authorities that continue to shape U.S.-Cuba immigration policy today. Under these agreements, all Cuban migrants intercepted at sea are returned to Cuba on the condition that they will not face persecution for leaving. Those who make it to U.S. soil, however, would be allowed to stay and begin the naturalization process after one year. Another element of the accords meant to relieve the pressure to leave Cuba was the pledge to issue at least 20,000 visas yearly to Cubans who entered an immigration pool. Before this arrangement, there was no minimum number of visas issued, but the maximum allowed was 20,000. Often, much fewer were issued. The migration agreements also called for regular diplomatic talks between the two governments. While these talks were conducted for several years, they were suspended in January 2004 due to conflicts over various issues. Each side blamed its counterpart for hurdles in issuing the full number of visas that were pledged yearly to Cuban citizens.

U.S. authorities cited five reasons for the break down in diplomatic talks: Cuban delays in issuing exit permits to those who were granted U.S. visas, lack of cooperation in establishing a new visa lottery system, refusal to grant access to deeper Cuban ports to allow repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea, obstacles to continued U.S. monitoring of returned migrants to ensure that they suffered no punishment for leaving the country without permission, and Cuba’s refusal to accept immigrants who had been convicted of a crime in the United States and were, therefore, no longer eligible for U.S. citizenship.[1] Cuban authorities called the suspension of talks a unilateral and irresponsible decision by the United States.[2] Dagoberto Rodriguez, the chief of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington in 2004, blamed the breakdown of immigration talks on the continued “warm welcome” for Cubans who arrived safely on U.S. shores.[3] Cuban authorities also bristled at the “imperial language” of U.S. diplomats who, according to the Cuban government, aimed to force Havana to yield to their “every whim and demand.”[4]

On July 31, 2006, Fidel Castro announced that he was handing over presidential duties to his younger brother, Raúl, following emergency intestinal surgery. Potential instability from this change in top leadership for the first time in nearly half a century caused speculation of another mass migration from the island. In response, President Bush issued changes to the existing immigration policy to limit the likelihood of such a recurrence. Approximately 8,000 of the 20,000 visas promised to Cuban citizens were redirected to facilitate family reunification. Under this plan, precedence for those 8,000 specially-targeted visas are first given to Cuban nationals whose close family members are U.S. citizens, then to family members of permanent residents. Migrants who try to enter illegally and are intercepted will be returned to Cuba, and will no longer be eligible for the family reunification pool. Although they would still be eligible for one of the other 12,000 visas issued yearly, this measure is an attempt to curb undocumented migration.

Despite these policies, however, more Cubans have been finding their way to the United States. The Cuban government credits this trend to the policy that guarantees a path to citizenship for those who reach U.S. soil, giving Cuban immigrants preferential treatment. This bias embedded in U.S. immigration policy causes resentment amongst immigrants of other nationalities. Such tensions have been particularly evident in Miami, the center of the largest Cuban exile community and a city that has swelled with growing immigrant populations from all over Latin America and the Caribbean. The number of Cubans making the journey to the United States has steadily increased since 1994 at an average rate of 38,000 new documented and undocumented immigrants entering per year since 2005.[5]

Raúl Castro, upon taking over presidential duties, initiated nationwide discussions on potential social, political and economic reforms to improve the socialist system. He expressed the need to reduce bureaucratic inefficiency and improve economic performance. Certain complaints that resonated most with Cubans, like the dual currency system, will be very difficult to address, however. Although Raúl has begun to institute certain structural changes, if the Cuban people do not soon benefit, disillusionment will likely grow. If the promised reforms yield only cosmetic changes, the sentiment that conditions will never change might drive many more to leave.

Many Cubans who attempt to enter the United States without a visa are still coming through Florida waters to reach U.S. shores and are arriving with greater success due to smuggling operations that employ high-speed boats to avoid the Coast Guard. Nonetheless, the path through Mexico now accounts for most of the traffic bringing Cubans to the United States. This route bypasses the U.S. Coast Guard, allowing Cubans to have “dry feet” even before they reach the United States. This “dusty foot” approach to entering the United States has become increasingly popular among both Cuban migrants and smugglers. The majority of Cuban migrants now follow that route, according to Customs and Border Protection statistics.[6] In fiscal year 2007, 11,487 Cuban migrants traveled through Mexico to reach the United States, while 4,825 Cubans entered through south Florida, and 2,861 were stopped by the U.S. Coast Guard.[7]

Although this path is far longer than the sea route to south Florida, many more migrants are able to elude authorities when passing through Mexico than when crossing U.S. waters. The Mexican Coast Guard is generally more concerned with narcotics trafficking than human smuggling, especially since nearly all Cubans who enter Mexico intend to continue on to the United States. When migration operations are hindered by Mexican authorities, often times smugglers’ boats are escorted to shore, confiscated, and the smugglers are then arrested. [8] Migrants are usually fined 10,000 Mexican pesos (approximately $920), then released with 30 days to leave the country. [9] Most find that to be more than enough time to make it to the U.S. border, where they are usually allowed to enter the country.[10]

Human smugglers will often charge people in the United States $8,000 to $10,000 to bring a Cuban family member into the country either through Florida or Mexico. When traveling through Mexico, they most often leave from the southwest shore of the island and land in the Caribbean state of Quintana Roo in Mexico, where they encounter a string of safe houses, transportation north and coaching on what to say to border guards to be allowed through.[11] Cubans with “knowledge of the business” say that migrant traffickers may allow people on board without paying the full fee for the journey, under the agreement that they would then work within the smuggling network as a form of payment, and would return to pick up more migrants.[12]

The growth of human trafficking through Mexico has created new problems, however. As smugglers shifted their paths to go west across the Caribbean, conflicts and turf wars have arisen. There have been several murders of Cuban citizens in the Yucatán Peninsula that are believed to be linked to the migrant smuggling trade.[13] The pathways used for human trafficking often overlap with narcotics trafficking routes, leading some authorities to fear that the two may become intertwined.[14] Cuban migration through Mexico has increased tensions between the two governments, whose relationship has already been strained. Problems arose between the Mexican government of Vicente Fox and Fidel Castro, culminating in both countries temporarily recalling their ambassadors in 2004. Full diplomatic relations have since been restored under the Felipe Calderón and Raúl Castro governments, but both countries have yet to draw up their own migration accords. The current situation, however, will soon need to be addressed.

In another new development spurred by Cuban migration through Mexico, some migrants of other nationalities are cashing in on U.S. immigration policy by pretending to be Cuban exiles. A growing trade in falsified Cuban identity papers has developed in Mexico, as some Mexican immigrants are practicing their Cuban accents and personal histories to convince U.S. Border Patrol officials that they must be allowed to stay in the United States.[15] If they are able pass as Cuban nationals, they will not be deported. Otherwise, however, they would be expelled from the United States.

Whichever path they choose, Cubans are coming into the United States in numbers not seen since the peak migration waves of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Some Cuba analysts are concerned by the large numbers, interpreting this trend as a sign that another mass migration has begun. The USAID-funded Cuba Transition Project of the University of Miami published a report stating that approximately 77,000 Cubans reached the United States from October 2005 through September 2007. That figure is almost double the number of people allowed into the country during the 1994 Balsero crisis, but includes both sanctioned and illegal migration. Although the actual number of visas issued “periodically falls short” of the 20,000 pledged by Washington,[16] authorized migration has accounted for over half of new Cuban residents. The rise of highly sophisticated and well-organized human smuggling operations, particularly through Mexico, has also accounted for much of the increase in Cuban migration.

President Bush has pledged to uphold the migration accords, despite any change in Cuban leadership. The allotted visas are considered an important method of easing internal pressure to leave Cuba, thereby reducing the risk of a mass migration from the island. Cancelling that provision could lead to a panic in Cuba, or a buildup in social tension that could spark an exodus. Such an event would be considered a security and humanitarian crisis in South Florida and nationwide as thousands of undocumented immigrants flood into the United States and overburden community infrastructure. Although the possibility of such an event exists, U.S. leadership has demonstrated minimal concern. President Bush announced in a speech on Oct. 24, 2007, that “the operative word in [the United States’] future dealings with Cuba is not ‘stability.’ The operative word is ‘freedom.’”[17] A lack of social or political stability, however, would most likely trigger the mass migration that the United States hopes to avoid. Although stated U.S. policy means to bring down the entire existing political regime in Cuba, thereby putting the United States at risk of a sudden wave of immigration, there are indications that the actual perceived threat of mass migration is minimal. If there was immediate concern of such an influx, U.S. policy would likely reflect that danger and adjust to minimize the risk rather than intensify it.

The U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, nonetheless, have developed a plan to deal with any wave of migration coming from the Caribbean. Developed in the wake of Sept. 11, “Operation Vigilant Sentry” is a military response plan that blocks access to U.S. shores and intends to contain potential migrants on their home shores. The Coast Guard has announced, however, that it considers the risk of a mass migration out of Cuba to be low for the near future. There were no special measures taken and no extra patrols put in place in response to Fidel Castro’s formal retirement in February 2008. If social and economic discontent rise in Cuba, however, or if fewer visas are issued, the desire to leave might overwhelm the channels in place to deal with it, thereby causing people to leave en masse. (To read more about the potential for mass migration from Cuba, read “Mass Migration from Cuba: How Likely?”)

There are some Cubans in the United States who dread a change in immigration policy, however: the more than 29,000 Cubans on U.S. soil who have criminal records from either the United States or Cuba, making them subject to deportation.[18] Cuba currently refuses to accept them back and Washington has ceased to press for their return, but those who do not qualify for U.S. citizenship due to a history of criminal activity fear that greater collaboration on immigration issues might lead to a repatriation agreement in the future. Such a measure, however, would take a very high level of cooperation between the two governments, which is unlikely under current diplomatic conditions.

Nonetheless, there have been steps toward greater cooperation. The April 2006 State Department annual report on terrorism pointed out Havana’s decision to no longer protect American criminals from extradition.[19] This signals an end to Cuba’s longtime refusal to return individuals wanted by the U.S. government. On Oct. 11, 2007, Cuban authorities handed over the third American fugitive to be returned to the United States within a year.[20] This shows a concerted effort on Havana’s part to amend its previous policy of noncooperation that stirred so much bitterness with U.S. officials.

Although immigration talks between Washington and Havana were discontinued in 2004, the measures implemented in the 1994 and 1995 accords continue to be upheld. They have not, however, managed to stem the undocumented flow of Cubans into the United States, but rather have made migrants change the way they travel by paying smugglers, using speedboats and traveling through alternate routes to reach U.S. soil.

There are no signs of diplomatic re-engagement under the Bush administration, but the 2008 presidential candidates show slightly more promise of being willing to reopen channels of communication with Havana. Democratic nomination hopeful Barack Obama announced during a debate in February 2008 that as president he would be willing to meet with Fidel Castro’s successor without preconditions as long as discussions included several human rights topics.[21] His rival for the Democratic nomination, Hillary Clinton, also acknowledged a possibility of engaging with the Cuban leadership, but only with “evidence that change was happening.”[22] John McCain, the presumptive Republican nominee, did not, however, acknowledge the possibility of meeting with any non-democratically elected government in Cuba.

There have been calls for structural change from Cubans, such as eliminating certain political and economic restrictions like the dual currency system, limits on internet access and visa requirements to leave the country. Raúl Castro has pushed through several reforms to address some of these social concerns, like allowing ownership of various consumer goods. While these changes have had a limited impact thus far, they may be a sign of more to come and might lead to the “change” that U.S. politicians are looking for before they engage Cuba. With new leadership on both sides of the Florida Straits within the year, and with possible continued reforms, there is a chance of renewed diplomatic talks, particularly on issues of mutual security, such as immigration, narcotics trafficking and disaster management.

Written By: Danielle Barav