U.S. government rhetoric toward Cuba has often categorized our southern neighbor as a security threat, yet experts in the field see Cuba posing a rather low risk. Fears of a biological weapons effort, stronger than anticipated military capacities, or Cuban terrorists have all arisen, but all have been discredited or ignored.[1] Nonetheless, with an influential Republican voting block in southern Florida, which has often been an important swing state, many politicians find it in their interest to highlight how dangerous Cuba may be to the United States. Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, has posited that the greatest threat that Cuba poses is through a possible mass migration. In a post-Sept. 11 political landscape such an event is seen as a national security risk, rather than solely burdensome to social infrastructure. There are varying estimates of how likely this occurrence is, however. The U.S. intelligence community and Coast Guard currently see a low risk of a mass exodus from Cuba, but certain developments on the island could greatly increase its likelihood in the future.

Although some Cuba analysts and U.S. politicians anticipate another wave of Cuban migrants, recalling the Mariel boatlift of 1980 (when 125,000 migrants entered the United States) or the Balsero crisis of 1994 (with 40,000 migrants coming ashore), the “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence” from February 2008 predicts that the “political situation [in Cuba] is likely to remain stable.” This makes the threat of mass migration minimal at least in the first few months following Raúl Castro’s selection as president.

Despite this assessment, Coast Guard and immigration reports show that the number of Cubans entering the U.S. or being intercepted in the attempt has doubled in the past year, and is at levels not seen in over 30 years. Though there are many factors that contribute to the rise, many see it as a sign that a large-scale migration has already begun. Consequently, this trend continues to be cited as an example of the danger that Cuba poses to U.S. security. Such an influx of people would place a crippling burden on local and state infrastructure, and might allow entry to hostile agents, putting national security at risk.

Mass migration is usually triggered by social or political instability. Despite the first new president in 49 years, however, Cuba has seen no significant turmoil develop. Fidel Castro officially announced that he was resigning the post of the presidency on Feb. 19, 2008 after temporarily handing power over to his younger brother, Raúl, in July 2006. This transfer of power was made permanent on Feb. 24, 2008, when the National Assembly elected Raúl Castro as the official head of state. Throughout this process of presidential change, however, the ruling political elite have remained roughly the same. Those who had stakes in Fidel’s government still find it in their best interest to support his brother’s regime. The younger Castro, in turn, appointed his staunch allies to the top governmental and military posts, making it hard to challenge the new president’s policies. The political elite in Cuba have the most to lose in the case of political upheaval, making them wary of challenging the status quo.

The entrenched nature of the system extends beyond top government and military officials, however. Cuba also employs a “massive security apparatus”[2] that has successfully infiltrated opposition groups and silenced dissent, reducing the likelihood and efficacy of grassroots opposition to the government that might spark a social movement.

Although many Cubans are discontented with various aspects of the system, the government has shown a willingness to pass targeted reforms that would alleviate some of these popular frustrations, and allow the current system to continue. Gary Marx, a reporter for the Chicago Tribune who was based in Havana for five years, argues that the “current system with modest reforms is sustainable for years to come.”[3] The government has, indeed, shown a willingness to implement cosmetic changes to reduce social tensions. When Cuban intellectuals complained about media censorship, for example, the leadership responded by airing two previously banned films on the state-run television network.[4] Raúl Castro has promised reforms that would improve the benefits conferred by the current system, but not change it.

The new president, upon taking over the duties of commander in chief, has encouraged the country to air its grievances in town hall discussions throughout the island. Cuban citizens started to question some of the most burdensome of governmental policies, including the dual currency system, restrictions on international travel, and limits on Internet access. Raúl raised hopes for change when he encouraged this dialogue, but not meeting those expectations could create a discontented and disillusioned public that could spark the exodus that Washington fears. Intelligence “czar” Mike McConnell affirmed the danger of Cuba failing to deliver on proposed reforms: “Policy missteps or the mishandling of a crisis by the Cuban leadership could spark instability in Cuba, raising the risk of mass migration.”[5]

Beyond the frustration that may be born of insufficient or ill-targeted reforms, or other political blunders, mass migration might also be sparked by the death of Fidel Castro. U.S. authorities including the Coast Guard, however, did not identify an elevated threat of Cuban migration upon Fidel’s retirement. The Coast Guard insisted that the “threat has not changed,”[6] and consequently refrained from increasing patrols of the Florida straights. Though permanently relinquishing power signaled a drastic change, Fidel has continued to make his presence and his influence felt. He has in no way departed the political scene, but rather has used his political clout to support certain early decisions of his brother, like Raúl’s choice of vice president and chief of the armed forces. When he passes away, however, the vacuum he may leave behind might still cause some instability among the population.

Another difference between previous migrations out of Cuba and the threat posed today is that all previous mass flights from the island had been government-sanctioned. During the Camarioca boatlift in 1965, the Mariel 1980 boatlift, and the Balsero crisis of 1994, the Cuban authorities allowed people to leave in large numbers to alleviate internal social pressure by purposefully not enforcing laws that prevented citizens from leaving the island without governmental approval.[7] The Cuban leadership also decided when to stop the flow of people off the island, and did so without violence even though not all who wanted to leave managed to do so. Many doubt that this would happen again under Raúl, however. Permitting another wave of immigration would not only create a destructive brain drain, it would also destabilize society and fan serious doubts about Raúl’s ability to govern effectively. It would also be quite challenging to stop the flow of migrants without erupting in to civil violence.[8] Raúl Castro will not likely be willing to risk weakening his government or public image, especially early on in his presidency.

Another reason the Cuban leadership might want to avoid another wave of emigration is due to the changes in U.S. policy in 1995 and 2001. After the Balsero crisis, the United States and Cuba established migration accords aimed at preventing another wave of rafters from leaving the island. This policy, established in 1995, earmarks 20,000 visas to be distributed over the course of each year to relieve some of the internal pressure that leads many Cubans to risk their lives crossing the Gulf of Mexico. Holly Ackerman, a specialist on the Cuban diaspora at Duke University and author of “The Cuban Balseros: Voyage of Uncertainty,” thinks it unlikely that the Cuban government would want to reverse the diplomatic gains made through the 1995 migration accords. Furthermore, she explains, since Sept.11 a mass migration might be viewed by the United States as a threat to national security, rather than simply a humanitarian crisis, provoking a military engagement that the Cuban leadership would rather avoid.[9]

Further efforts have been taken to discourage illegal immigration from Cuba. On August 11, 2006, not two weeks after Fidel passed the baton to his younger brother, President Bush amended the immigration accords to further discourage large-scale immigration. Although the number of visas issued would remain the same, U.S. authorities announced that it would give preference to backlogged applications from Cubans with relatives in the United States, reserving approximately 8,000 of the total number of visas for family members of U.S. citizens and residents.[10] Those who try to come over illegally would still be stopped and returned to Cuba, and, once back on the island, would no longer be eligible for preferred family visa processing.[11] They would continue to be eligible, however, for the general visa pool. The U.S. government has stated that it will not stop issuing the 20,000 yearly visas that it has pledged to Cuban citizens, regardless of changes in the Cuban leadership, in order to prevent a buildup of social pressure in Cuba.[12]

The United States has gone beyond adjusting its immigration policies to reduce the risk of a mass migration from Cuba, however. The Coast Guard and military have also developed response plans to thwart such an effort. The main strategy to avoid a massive influx of new immigrants from the Caribbean is called “Operation Vigilant Sentry.” Under this plan developed in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Coast Guard vessels and U.S. Customs and Border Protection aircraft would establish a ‘perimeter’ around the country experiencing the flood of emigration.[13] This wall of ships, with air support and a command center based in Miami, would aim to intercept migrants close to their home territory, and repatriate them quickly in order to deter more people from leaving for the United States.[14] The Coast Guard would also seek to prevent vessels leaving from Florida to pick up those who managed to get through the barrier. The efficacy of this plan was tested in February 2004 when nearly 1,000 Haitians were blocked in their attempt to enter the United States following the dismantling of Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government.[15] Furthermore, the U.S. has prepared for the possibility of a wave of émigrés from Cuba through a two-day response drill involving approximately 50 local, state, and federal agencies. This exercise practiced migrant-interdiction and procedures to intercept vessels heading to Cuba out of south Florida.[16]

Despite assessments that a mass migration out of Cuba is unlikely if the political situation continues as it has since Fidel’s transfer of power, some claim that it has already begun. Since fiscal year 2000, over 191,000 Cubans have settled in the U.S.—more than the number that came over on the Mariel boatlift and the Balsero crisis combined.[17] Although Coast Guard figures support the fact that immigration from Cuba is at its highest levels since the early 1970s, with an average of 38,000 new migrants reaching the United States per year since fiscal year 2005,[18] these figures reflect more the changing methods of entering the U.S. than the beginnings of a mass migration.

Since the Balsero crisis, the U.S. government has set aside over 20,000 visas annually for Cuban nationals to prevent such a flow in the future. This provision was not in place before 1994 and, therefore, accounts for a significant portion of the increase in Cuban immigrants since then. Additionally, the number of smugglers taking Cubans in fast boats past Coast Guard patrols and into the United States has increased significantly, and they are better organized and more equipped than ever. Family members in south Florida now pay anywhere from $8,000 to $10,000 to bring their relatives to shore.[19] U.S. courts have been prosecuting and convicting increasing numbers of migrant smugglers in the past few years.[20] Alternate pathways through Mexico have also increased greatly in popularity, with double the number of migrants coming through Mexico in FY 2007 (11,487 people) than in FY 2005.[21]

Although more and more Cubans are finding their way into the United States, we have not yet seen indications of a wave of migrants leaving Cuba at once, but rather a steady trickle that, in recent years, has grown stronger thanks to better transportation methods and more open immigration policies. Most analysts predict that the social and political landscape in Cuba will remain largely unchanged, even into “the initial months following Fidel Castro’s death.”[22] While some predict that the retired comandante’s death might spark a flight from the island, others insist that if a mass migration were to occur, it would be inspired by deep-seated frustrations over the lack of political and economic reforms promised by Raúl Castro. Petty Officer Robert Simpson, a spokesman for the U.S. Coast Guard, said that they believe “no single event will cause a mass migration.”[23] Nonetheless, if the administration chose to cancel the 1995 migration accords, it might be a potential catalyst of such a wave of migrants. The U.S. government has pledged, however, to uphold them, despite what the lack of democratic participation in deciding Cuba’s new leader. Reporter Gary Marx suggests that ending the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba might also trigger an exodus by strengthening the Cuban economy and boosting trade, all of which would make strict governmental controls over society more difficult to maintain.[24] A sudden influx of new immigrants would be a tremendous burden on the social and political functioning of south Florida communities. Though it is unlikely to happen, the possibility of such an occurrence does exist. Furthermore, it remains in many politicians’ best interest to rally voters around the issue of a dangerous Cuba. For example, Republican presidential candidate John McCain cited Cuba as a “national security threat,” asserting that it is in the Unites States’ interest that “the Cuban people live in freedom.”[25] Congressmen from south Florida often tailor their platforms on major issues like immigration to win the vote of hard-liners in the Cuban-American community.[26] Therefore, while the actual acknowledged potential of a mass migration is low, it remains a powerful political tool.

Written By: Danielle Barav