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Increases in Cuban Military Spending Reflect Economic Recovery

March 7, 2008

Since 2003, military expenditure in Cuba has increased, causing some concern in the United States. Although the Cuban government has been investing more in its armed forces, the increase has coincided with recent economic growth, allowing repairs and improvements to a military that had shrunk by almost three-quarters within 10 years. During the “special period,” or the time of severe economic hardship that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of Soviet military and economic assistance, the Cuban armed forces faced extreme fuel, supply and food shortages as the government diverted resources towards providing the basic needs of its population. As Cuba slowly recovered, it was able to return its attention to sectors that were, out of necessity, largely ignored, including the military. With recent annual GDP growth of about 7 percent according to the CIA [1] and estimated to be as high as 10 percent by Cuban authorities, Cuba has been able to direct more resources toward upgrading long-neglected military equipment and forces. Despite increased spending, however, there has been little recruitment of new forces, and military expenditure has remained at almost the same percentage of GDP as it was 2001.

The Cuban military is primarily equipped with Soviet weapons and supplies that were either donated or bought at extremely subsidized costs during the Cold War. From shortly after the 1959 revolution and up until the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991, Cuba received military aid from the USSR, including free weapons and low-priced trucks, helicopters, transport planes and spare parts.[2] These military contributions from 1961 to 1990 were estimated by Raúl Castro to be worth $30 billion.[3]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cuban economy contracted by as much as two-thirds, and there were few resources to devote to maintaining military equipment or purchasing newer models. Paralleling the loss of national income, military expenditure also dropped by nearly 60 percent between 1990 and 1991, from $1.44 billion to $605 million in the dollar value of 2000.[4] By 1994 that budget shrunk to be 72 percent lower than 1990 levels, at $406 million.

The Cuban economy began to recover in the late 1990s and into 2000 due to economic reforms and the growth of the tourism, oil and copper industries. This provided more money to use towards re-supplying the military. Cuban military commanders have claimed a “four-fold” increase in Cuba’s military budget within the past 10 years to “modernize the armed forces.”[5] According to estimates by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Cuba spent an estimated $350 million in 1994, which is $406 million in 2000 dollar value.[6] The Military Balance compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2008 claims a military expenditure of $1.66 billion in 2006 (in the dollar value of 2000).[7] This is, in fact, a four-fold increase. The Military Balance figures for military expenditure in 2001, $1.1 billion, and 2006[8], $1.66 billion[9], do confirm the steady and significant increase in spending on the armed forces.

Despite the increases, spending in relation to annual GDP has remained relatively constant. In 2001, Havana spent 3.9 percent of national GDP on defense, while in 2004 that fraction rose by only 0.1 of a percentage point, to 4 percent of GDP, where it remained through 2006. (Calculations for the 2007 defense budget as a function of GDP were not available in the 2008 Military Balance.) This shows that Cuba is not building up its army, but rather has only recently had the resources to devote to repairing a sector that had been largely sidelined during the “special period.”

A report on the 2006 budget compiled by the Cuban parliament discussed the increase in spending, explaining that it provides the military “the necessary resources for maintaining and developing the combat capacity and the material reserves to guarantee the requirements for the country’s defense and the preservation of domestic order.”[10] U.S. rhetoric, though it has long been hostile towards Cuba, has increasingly begun to make Havana nervous, particularly with the temporary shift of power to Raúl Castro in July 2006. This change in the political leadership has made Cuba sensitive to both internal and external threats to the status quo. Although Raúl has proclaimed a willingness in his speeches to improve relations with the United States, he lists non-interference in Cuban politics as a necessary condition for any engagement. He also has carefully highlighted on several occasions the island’s determination and capacity to defend itself. Raúl not only claimed this to be true in his speeches, but he also demonstrated his sincerity by exhibiting Cuba’s military equipment in the first large-scale parade in a decade in December 2006.[11] Though somewhat a function of Cuba only recently being able to afford the extravagance of a large parade, this festive demonstration of military capabilities was interpreted by many in the international community to serve as a warning to the United States to not underestimate Cuba’s resolve or capacity to defend itself.[12]

Although Havana still does not possess the resources to purchase many new weapons, the military is investing in upgrades to “modernize” their existing equipment.[13] Since 2003, Cuba has begun to invest more heavily in spare parts, citing “a greater U.S. threat under President [Bush]” as the motivation.[14] The military has been refitting the Soviet-made military vehicles they imported decades ago, adding “cannons, special armor, guns where there once were none, special maneuvering capacity, and other combat-ready assets to improve their firepower and self-protection abilities.”[15]

Since the 1980s, Havana has readied itself for “a massive air war,” rather than a ground invasion, if the United States were ever to attack.[16] Consequently, Havana has been targeting its military spending to improve the country’s ability to respond to such an anticipated attack strategy. When commenting on military drills carried out in the last weeks of 2006, a retired Cuban military official said, “80 percent of the equipment that was on display was anti-air—anti-aircraft and anti-helicopter—as helicopters are the preferred U.S. troop transport mode.”[17]

According to an article published in the Miami Herald on Sept. 4, 2007, Russia offered Cuba a $350 million credit package the year before to “modernize its armed forces.”[18] Although Russia did extend a $350 million line of credit to Havana in September 2006, it is unclear how much of that money is to be funneled into the armed forces. Moscow has decided to restructure approximately $166 million of Cuba’s recently acquired debt, extend large amounts of credit to its government and even sign a military cooperation agreement with Havana. Nonetheless, Mikhail Fradkov, Russia’s prime minister at the time, said the credit would be used to buy Russian goods and services, and to “help modernize Cuba’s energy sector and transportation system, reconstruct water conservation facilities and railroads, and design and deliver air navigation systems.”[19] It is unclear what portion of the $350 million credit line will go to the armed forces. The Miami Herald article also cites the $3 billion in economic aid that Venezuela provides Cuba as a security threat to the United States, though there is no evidence that any of that money goes directly to the military. Nonetheless, some argue that the heavily subsidized oil that Venezuela exports to Cuba has allowed Havana to redirect other resources to building their military capacity.[20] This could be said, however, of any economic aid that the island receives.

Cuba’s military has borne the brunt of significant economic neglect throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century. The Military Balance of 2002-2003 through to 2004-2005 notes that 75 percent of the air force’s equipment was “in store.”[21] Indeed, up until 2007, the Cuban navy consisted of four patrol craft with surface-to-surface missile capacity, and one coastal patrol craft.[22] In 2007, that inventory went up to six navy ships with missile capacity, and stayed there into 2008.[23] Although the military budget has increased, there has been little arms buildup. Most of those funds have been used to repair and update equipment that was already in Cuba’s possession. Troop numbers have increased 6 percent between the steady armed forces count of 46,000 from 2001 to 2003 to 49,000 in 2004, and have remained constant through 2007.[24] This increase, however, likely represents the renewed ability to economically sustain a larger military force, which is still less than one third the troop strength of more than 161,000 in 1985. While Cuba’s military technology is still drastically outdated compared to that of the United States, Cuba has been strategically upgrading it to respond to the threat that it considers most likely: a possible air strike. Cuba is also forging economic and diplomatic relations with countries that can furnish its military with the equipment it seeks, including Russia and China. Cuba is now trying to rebuild a military that suffered an acute and dramatic period of neglect.



[1] “World Factbook: Cuba.” Central Intelligence Agency. 28 February, 2008. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html#Econ

[2] Patricia Grogg. “Cuba: With Fidel Ailing, Raúl Plans Big Show of Weaponry.”

[3] Carlos Batista. “Pimp My Tank: Cuba remakes weapons with U.S. foe in mind.” Agence France-Presse. 2 December, 2006.

[4] “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995.” U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1995. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/wmeat95/wmeatcov.htm

[5] “Cuba modernizing armed forces.” Not attributed. Latinnews Daily. 28 August, 2007.

[6] “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995.” U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1995. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/wmeat95/wmeatcov.htm 

[7] The Military Balance 2004—2005. Ed. Christopher Langton. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Routledge: London, 2008.

[8] The Military Balance 2004—2005. Ed. Christopher Langton. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Routledge: London, 2005.

[9] The Military Balance 2004—2005. Ed. Christopher Langton. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Routledge: London, 2008.

[10] Patricia Grogg. “Cuba: With Fidel Ailing, Raúl Plans Big Show of Weaponry.”

[11] Anita Snow. “Castro absent from military parade, birthday celebrations.” Associated Press. 3 December, 2006.

[12] Ibid.

[13]“Cuba modernizing armed forces.” Not attributed. Latinnews Daily. 28 August, 2007.

[14] Carlos Batista. “Pimp My Tank: Cuba remakes weapons with U.S. foe in mind.” Agence France-Presse. 2 December, 2006.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Carlos Batista. “Pimp My Tank: Cuba remakes weapons with U.S. foe in mind.” Agence France-Presse. 2 December, 2006.

[17] Ibid.

[18]Jaime Suchlicki. “Don’t expect too much from Raúl Castro.” The Miami Herald. 4 September, 2007.

[19] Andrea Rodriguez. “Russia to grant Cuba $350 million credit, restructure some debt.” The Associated Press. 28 September, 2006.

[20] “Cuba modernizing armed forces.” Not attributed. Latinnews Daily. 28 August, 2007.

[21] The Military Balance 2004—2005. Ed. Christopher Langton. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Routledge: London, 2005.

[22] The Military Balance 2006. Ed. Christopher Langton. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Routledge: London, 2006.

[23] The Military Balance 2008. Ed. James Hackett. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Routledge: London, 2008.

[24] Ibid.