Cuban Issues

Cuban Biotech: Open Doors Build Confidence

November 10, 2004

"The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort."[1] With those words in May 2002, Undersecretary of State John Bolton triggered an uproar.Did Cuba indeed possess Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)? If so, would it become the next target of U.S. pre-emptive military action? If not, what do the allegations say about U.S. credibility in the war on terror, already damaged by its inability to find WMD in Iraq?

To address these charges, the Center for Defense Information has traveled to Cuba three times since 2002 to find out more about the Cuban biotechnology sector, including a trip in October 2004 in conjunction with the Center for International Policy. On these trips, scientists and bioweapons experts have found no evidence of a Cuban biowarfare (BW) effort. We did find a remarkable degree of openness on the part of the Cuban government to open up its scientific centers to external visits. We also found an advanced vaccine and pharmaceutical industry that makes sense in the context of Cuba's commitment to national health care, disease prevention, and earning hard currency in the international market.

Of course, it is extremely difficult to prove a negative, that Cuba does not have a BW effort. We did not go everywhere and look in every broom closet, nor were our visits "inspections" with the elements of surprise and confrontation which that word implies. Also, any country with a pharmaceutical industry has the capability to develop biowarfare agents. In addition, the ambiguous nature of bioweapons, which can be produced in dual-use facilities that also have legitimate functions, makes their existence extremely difficult to prove. But the Cuban government's general openness on this issue, and willingness to host repeated site visits, indicates Cuba's interest in addressing these allegations head on in an effort to put them to rest.

Two days after Secretary Bolton's May 2002 statement, I was meeting with a representative of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington as part of the regular work of CDI's Cuba Project. I asked how Cuba would respond to a request to bring a group of experts down to learn more about these charges. Soon thereafter we were extended an open invitation: come down when you want, bring whomever you want, and go wherever you want.

We chose nine facilities of interest and spent more than 30 hours touring them, ranging from the flagship Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB) to "La Fabriquita," a low-tech processing center for nutritional supplements made from shark cartilage, run by the military. (The latter was the only place we were prevented from videotaping, a decision that was reversed during the October 2004 visit.) We were frequently asked if we wanted to look elsewhere, or if we wanted to break the seals on doors and look behind them (sometimes we did). We were asked if there was anywhere we'd like to go in addition to the nine facilities. We talked with mid-level staff members. We videotaped and photographed.

What emerged was a picture of an advanced, state-funded biotechnology sector with an impressive array of products and a fairly deep pipeline of new ones in development. (California-based CancerVax recently received an exception to the U.S. trade embargo to license three experimental cancer vaccines developed in Cuba, based on their life-saving potential.) The Cuban pharmaceutical sector is oriented more toward public health, and less toward profit, than ours, although it aspires to make inroads on the global market. Every Cuban is immunized against 13 diseases, and millions of cheap doses of vaccines such as hepatitis-B are exported to the developing world. Some centers appeared to be well-funded, while others showed signs of the economic strains predominant in Cuba.

Following that trip, we published Cuban Biotechnology: A First-Hand Report,[2] an illustrated 50-page assessment. Among its conclusions:

"Given the nature and range of international contacts and joint ventures, the relatively open system, and the attitude and approach of the staff to their work, it would be very unlikely that there is any work on biological weapons at any of the facilities visited," according to Terence Taylor, who served as a commissioner and chief inspector for the U.N.'s Special Commission to Iraq.

"While Cuba certainly has the capability to develop and produce chemical and biological weapons, nothing we saw or heard led us to the conclusion that they are proceeding on this path," wrote retired Gen. Charles Wilhelm, whose region of responsibility included Cuba when he was commander of U.S. Southern Command.

"I would personally consider it irresponsible to issue charges based on unrevealed evidence without also attempting to arrange for the direct, reassuring access that the Cubans are apparently offering," reported Dr. John Steinbruner of the National Academy of Sciences Bioweapons Working Group.

"Scientist-to-scientist interactions cut through to true purposes, and cut through allegations made by non-scientists for political purposes," wrote The Hon. Philip E. Coyle, former assistant secretary of defense and chief weapons tester for the Pentagon.

Scientific exchanges, on a regular and ongoing basis, are one of the best ways to create transparency and build confidence in the rapidly-evolving biotechnology field. Scientists can't "blow smoke" in each others' faces and get away with it, making a clandestine weapons program difficult to hide from a resident visiting scholar. Our next biotech-oriented trip, in November 2003, included key members of the National Academy of Sciences seeking to establish a framework for such regularized cooperation. Many believe that current U.S. policy, which blocks almost all Cuban scientists from entering the United States and has increasingly denied licenses to American scientists to travel to Cuba, works against our national interests in this area.

The October 2004 trip sought to add to the knowledge database about Cuban biotech centers by visiting four new and two previously visited sites. The new sites visited:

We also asked for a return visit to the National Center for Agricultural and Livestock Health (CENSA), because of concerns by a member of previous delegation that the layout of the labs was inconsistent with their stated purpose, and that the research work we were shown appeared to be staged. This second visit was again almost completely taken up with an oral presentation, and the vast center's empty hallways and labs still do not square with the broad array of activities and products depicted in the PowerPoint presentations. This does not imply malfeasance, and more likely represents diminished funding, but this center might warrant a more in-depth visit in the future.

We were taken again to La Fabriquita, the shark cartilage processing plant run by the military across the street from the Luis Diaz Soto Hospital. (The Cuban military has become increasingly involved in economic pursuits as a result of budget and troop cuts of more than 50 percent since 1989.) This time, the officers invited us to roll video, perhaps perceiving that the restriction on taping there during the previous trip created the appearance of trying to hide something. This facility has been described in exile-sourced articles as an ominous fortified germ warfare center where "military biotechnicians reportedly experiment on cadavers, hospital patients and live animals with anthrax, brucellosis, equine encephalitis, dengue fever, hepatitis, tetanus and a variety of other bacterial agents."[3] Here we saw, as in 2002, a low-tech processing center, with a short mesh fence and minimal security, where workers removed cartilage from shark carcasses. It is dried on racks (along with aloe vera extract, another of La Fabriquita's products) and milled to a 63 micron powder (weaponized agents must be milled below 12 microns). The powder is then shipped out, put in capsules, and marketed under the name "Cartilade-C." This kind of discrepancy between what is written about Cuba and the reality on the ground is common, and argues for caution in intelligence assessments.

Two weeks before our visit, evidence of such caution emerged. The New York Times reported that a new National Intelligence Estimate downgrading allegations on Cuban bioweapons had been conducted[4]. Representing the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community, the report reflects more stringent standards adopted in the wake of intelligence failures associated with the misreporting of WMD in Iraq. It does say "the IC continues to believe that Cuba has the technical capability to pursue some aspects of an offensive biological weapons program." It also continues to express concern about Cuba's sharing of dual-use technology with countries such as Iran[5]. But it does not claim Cuba has a biological weapons effort. This new assessment was welcome news on the eve of our trip, and helped make the case that openness and transparency serve to build confidence.

Can we be certain Cuba is not pursuing biological weapons? Of course not, for all the reasons listed earlier. But the openness demonstrated by the Cubans has been encouraging, and the doors appear to be open to continue this process. Furthermore, it has the potential to lead to scientific exchanges and collaboration in efforts to combat the growing threat of infectious disease. During the recent spate of hurricanes, the United States and Cuba were quietly cooperating by sharing weather data from radars and aircraft to help each country better prepare for the devastation. This underscores the fact that the United States and Cuba can cooperate on issues of mutual concern even in a hostile political climate. Like hurricanes, infectious diseases know no borders, and U.S.-Cuba cooperation in stopping their spread would be in everyone's best interests.

[1] Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, in "Beyond the Axis of Evil," a speech delivered at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., May 6, 2002
[2] Available online at www.uscubasecurity.org
[3] Martin Arostegui, "Fidel Castro's Deadly Secret: Castro's Biological and Chemical Weapons Arsenal," Insight on the News, July 20, 1998, published by the Washington Times
[4] Steven R. Weisman, "In Stricter Study, U.S. Scales Back Claim on Cuba Arms," New York Times, Sept. 18, 2004
[5] Cuba asserts that these transfers, with partners such as India, China, Iran, and Russia, are legitimate vaccine-related projects within the bounds of international law. Deputy Foreign Minister Rafael Dausa told our group, "All transfers have been made in the framework of South-South cooperation. The transfers are being made in a transparent way, with crystal-clear conditions and no secret agreements," and "Cuba is developing its biotech industry for the well-being of the Cuban people and the world."

Author(s): Glenn Baker